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I. INTRODUCTION
When an attorney disserves a client or a third party so as to give
rise to a cause of action against the attorney, one, or more, of a num-
ber of statutes of limitations or other time limitations might apply to
limit the right to bring the lawsuit against the attorney. In West Vir-
ginia these time periods appear to range from one year after discovery
of the injury,' two years after discovery of the injury,2 five years, 3
or ten years4 after the relevant attorney-client contract was breached,
or an indefinite time as determined by the common law doctrine of la-
ches.5 This Article provides a brief overview of the issues commonly
arising in statutes of limitations problems, and then briefly examines
the West Virginia statutes and case law in an attempt to clarify which
statutory period applies, or if none then whether laches applies, when a
claimant brings a suit against an attorney for loss caused by the
attorney's wrongful conduct.
H. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS GENERALLY
Statutes of limitations are legislative6 time limitations within
which a person with a cause of action must bring suit or forever lose
1. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12(c) (1981); Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello,
207 S.E.2d 157, 160 (W. Va. 1974).
2. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12(a) (1981); Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901, 904-05 (W.
Va. 1990).
3. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6 (1981); see Harrison v. Casto, 271 S.E.2d 774, 776 (W.
Va. 1980).
4. Harrison, 271 S.E.2d at 776.
5. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 399 S.E.2d 664, 670 (W. Va. 1990); Bank of Mill Creek v.
Elkhom, 57 S.E.2d 736, 746-47 (W. Va. 1950).
6. Statutes of limitations have always been statutory, not existing at common law.
H.G. WOOD & D.C. MOORE, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 4 (1916). State-
ments to the contrary by Lord Bracton are extremely doubtful, "as doubtful as the Latinity."
a (citing H.T. BANNING, LAW OF THE LMITATION OF ACTIONS (1906)).
[Vol. 95:913
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the right to invoke judicial redress The basic purposes of statutes of
limitations are to encourage promptness in instituting actions, to sup-
press stale demands, to defeat fraudulent claims, to avoid inconve-
nience which may result from delay in asserting rights or claims when
it is practical to assert them,8 and to allow a person to rest, at peace,
without worrying about mistakes made long ago.'
7. Statutes of limitations are distinguished from "presumptions" in that they are a
complete bar to suit, not just a presumption of payment arising from passage of time.
Clendenning's Adm'r. v. Thompson's Ex'r., 22 S.E. 233 (Va. 1895). They differ from "pre-
scription," which terminates the substantive right to recovery, in that they only terminate the
remedy. Although statutes of limitations are a kind of "statute of repose" in that they are
designed in part to allow a person after time to no longer worry about past problems, they
differ from a pure statute of repose in that the repose limitation runs from the occurrence
of the event and is absolute, while the statute of limitations runs from the accrual of the
cause of action, which might arise after the damage causing event, and can be tolled by
intervening disabilities. The obligation still exists after the statute of limitations has run, and
may be revived by certain acts such as new promises. See Sudreski v. State Compensation
Comm'r, 181 S.E. 545 (1935) (statute gave a dependent a right to workers' compensation
benefits if claim filed within six months of injury; the court held that where the statute
creates a special right that did not exist without the statute, a time limitation in the statute
which qualifies the right is generally not tolled by disabilities and excuses which allay
ordinary statutes of limitations, and the right created does not survive the limitation). State
ex reL Battle v. Demkovich, 136 S.E.2d 895 (W. Va. 1964) (where the statute provided
that action to collect taxes must be brought within five years, but the tax debtor later made
a promise to pay the taxes, the court held the time period began anew upon the promise,
stating that the statute does not extinguish the debt, but merely bars the recovery); see also
United States v. Polan Indus., Inc. 196 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. W. Va. 1961), discussed in 64
W. VA. L. REV. 228 (1962).
For a pure statute of repose applying to architects, engineers and contractors, see W.
VA. CODE § 55-2-6(a) (1981), applied in Gibson v. West Virginia Dep't of Highways, 406
S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1991) (plaintiffs, alleging their injuries were caused by an improperly
constructed highway, apparently timely brought their suit within the tort statute of limitation
period, but more than ten years after the road had been constructed; however, in an opinion
mainly discussing the constitutionality of the statutes, the court held the action was.barred
by the West Virginia construction statute of repose).
8. Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156, 161 (W. Va. 1965) (plaintiff did
not discover the sponge left in her abdomen by the defendant physician until some time
after the operation.), discussed in 68 W. VA. L. REV. 220 (1966); Gray v. Johnson, 267
S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1980) (defendant's absence from the state does not toll the limitations
statute where defendant can be served under nonresident motorist statute, but only where
defendant has a mailing address).
9. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944).
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Statutes of limitations were promulgated at least as early as
1236.10 A later comprehensive statute enacted under James I in
162311 was generally adopted by the American colonies.12  Some
statutes of limitations are very general in their scope, 3 while others
are very specific." The West Virginia Code contains more than sev-
enty individual statutes of limitations or related provisions. 15
10. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREbERIC w. MArTLAND, THm HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW 81 (2d ed. 1898).
11. "An Acte for lymytacon of Accons, and for avoyding of Suite in Lawe." 21
James J. C. 16, IV THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 1222 (1819). This statute provided in
part:
For quieting of Mens Estates and avoiding of Suits, Be it enacted by the Kings
most excellent Majestic, the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Comons in this
prsent Parliament assembled, That all Writts of Formedon in Descender, Formedon
in Remainder and Formedon in Reverter, at any tyme hereafter to be sued or
brought of or for any Mannors Lands Tenements or Hereditaments whereunto any
prson or prsons now hath or have any Title, or cause to have or pursue any such
Writt, shall be sued and taken within Twentie yeares next after the end of this
prsent Session of Parliament; and after the said Twentie yeares expired, no prson
or prsons, or any of their heires, shall have or mayntayne any such Writt of or
for any of the said Mannors Lands Tenements or Hereditaments.
Id
12. J.K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF AcTIONS AT LAW iii-vi, 10,
(1869).
13. "Every action . . . upon a contract in writing, signed . . . [must be brought]
within ten years ... ." W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6 (1981).
14. A person has three months to bring an action to compel the return of a payment
made on a gambling debt. W. VA. CODE § 55-9-2 (1981).
15. Although the major statutes of limitations are found in Chapter 55, Article 2, of
the West Virginia Code, dozens are distributed throughout the West Virginia Code. Some
(but not all) of these statutes are:
TORT LENGTH W. VA. CODE §
whistle blower discharge 180 days 6C-1-4
actions not surviving death 1 year 55-2-12
personal injury or property damage 2 years 55-2-12
same against local government 2 years 29-12A-6
wrongful death 2 years 55-7-6
medical malpractice 2 years 55-7B-4
injury from chemical defoliants during war 2 years 16-28-10
violation of wage statute 2 years 21-5-8
injury from oil or gas well explosion 3 years 22B-1-27
misappropriation of trade secret 3 years 47-22-6
violation of antitrust laws 4 years 47-18-11
injury from design or construction 10 years 55-2-6a
4
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The first step in determining the time period in which an action
must be brought is to determine which statute or statutes apply,, if any.
In some cases where the lawsuit is brought to enforce a traditionally
equitable right, courts have held that no statute of limitations applies,
and that the action is governed by laches. 16 The character of the stat-
against fiduciary for account 10 years 55-2-7
CONTRACT
recovery of a paid gambling debt 3 months 55-9-2
sale of goods 4 years 46-2-725
against copartner on partnership accounts 5 years 55-2-6
trade accounts between merchants 5 years 55-2-6
unwritten or unsigned contract 5 years 55-2-6
signed written contract 10 years 55-2-6
REAL PROPERTY
mechanics lien 6 months 38-2-34
distrain rent 1 year 37-6-12
challenge condominium declaration 1 year 36B-2-117
redeem tax sale after disability 1 year 11A-3-35
redeem tax sale after disability 1 year 1 1A-4-34
damages for unlawful entry 3 years 55-3-1, 2
breach of condominium warranty 6 years 36B-4-116
recover land from adverse possession 10 years 55-2-1
after disability 5 years 55-2-3
expiration of lien on realty 20 years 55-2-5
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
health service regulation violations 3 years 16-20-14
tax liens 5 years 55-2-19a
personal liability on property taxes 5 years 11A-2-2
wrongly received unemployment benefits 5 years 21A-10-8
fraudulently induced unemployment benefits 10 years 21A-10-8
OTHER
fraudulent transfers 1 year 40-1A-9(c)
fraudulent transfers 4 years 40-1A-9
new action after abatement 1 year 39-3-5
new action after abatement 1 year 55-2-18
creditor actions against heirs 2 years 44-2-26,27
judgment against representative of decedent 5 years 38-3-18
action on foreign judgment 10 years 55-2-13
execution of judgment 10 years 38-5-18
reappearing supposed decedent action to set 15 years 44-9-12
aside distribution of estate
16. No statute of limitations applies to a purely equitable action. Instead, the issue of
5
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ed cause of action will usually determine which statute applies. Be-
cause a single event may give rise to more than one cause of action
(for example, tort and contract), more than one statute of limitations
might apply to any happening, and the claimant might have a choice
of two or more different statutory time periods.17 Where the cause of
action relates to a contract made between the parties, the contract
might effectively provide a limitation period different than that in the
applicable statute.1 8
The second step is to determine the date on which the limitation
period in the applicable statute begins to run. The statute of limitations
ordinarily begins to run the day after19 the day when the right to
bring an action accrues.2" For a personal injury, the cause of action
generally accrues when the injury is inflicted.21 A breach of contract
action accrues when the contract performance is due, but not per-
formed.?
The third step is to determine if some fact or occurrence will
delay, or toll,23 the beginning of the running of the statutory time
timeliness is governed by the common-law doctrine of laches. Felsenfeld v. Bloch Bros.
Tobacco Co., 192 SE. 545, 549 (W. Va. 1937) (corporate directors are viewed as trustees
of the corporation, and a shareholder derivative suit is an action in trust against the trustees
(at least in 1937); courts of equity have exclusive jurisdiction in cases of trusts, and statutes
of limitations never run against the exclusive jurisdiction of the equity court).
17. Harrison v. Casto, 271 S.E.2d 774, 776 (W. Va. 1980); Hall v. Nichols, 400
S.E.2d 901, 904-05 (W. Va. 1990).
18. See Hilton v. Norfolk & West R.R., 194 F. Supp. 915 (S.D. W. Va. 1961). For a
statute authorizing parties to alter the period by agreement, see W. VA. CODE § 46-2-725(1)
(1966) (covering transactions in goods).
19. The day on which the cause of action accrues is not computed in calculating the
limitations period. Steeley v. Funkhouser, 169 S.E.2d 701, 705 (W. Va. 1969). The lawsuit
itself is deemed to begin when "a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court" See W. VA. R. CIv. P. 3.
20. Steeley, 169 S.E.2d at 702; Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589, 593
(W. Va. 1985).
21. Jones v. Trustees of Bethany College, 351 S.E.2d 183, 184 (W. Va. 1986); Cart
v. Marcum, 423 S.E.2d 644, 646 (W. Va. 1992).
22. This could mean when a promised installment payment is missed, G.T. Fogel &
Co. v. King, 51 S.E.2d 776 (W. Va. 1948), when a promised performance is not performed,
Annon v. Lucas, 185 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va. 1971), when an agent terminates employment,
Wren v. Wein, 12 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 1940), and when goods which do not conform to
contract warranties are delivered to the buyer. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-725 (1966).
23. "Tolling" is a term used variously to denote delaying the beginning of the running
6
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period or interrupt it after it has started. Some conditions of the plain-
tiff, such as infancy or insanity, delay the beginning of the limitation
period by statute.' Some actions of the defendant, such as leaving
the jurisdiction2 or fraudulently concealing the harm,26 will delay
the beginning of the limitation period. Similarly, some actions or omis-
sions of the plaintiff, such as failing to discover the injury (the discov-
ery rule), will either delay the beginning of the limitation period, or
delay the accrual of the cause of action with like effect.27 Some ac-
tions taken by both parties, such as continuing their attorney-client
relationship past the occurrence date of the wrongful act (the continu-
ous representation rule), will delay the beginning of the limitation peri-
od.28 After the limitation period has begun to run, it can be interrupt-
ed and suspended by the onset of a statutory condition such as insani-
of the statute until sometime later than the cause of action arises, delaying the arising of
the cause of action itself until sometime later than the occurrence of the wrongful act
which precipitates the loss giving rise to the cause of action, interrupting the running of the
statute once it has begun, and beginning anew the running of the statute. See BLACK'S LAW
DICMTONARY 1488 (6th ed. 1990).
24. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15 (1981).
25. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-17 (1981).
26. Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967), discussed in 70 W. VA. L.
REV. 438 (1968) (patient alleged that during visits to the operating physician after the eye
operation the defendant physician repeatedly assured patient that his eye was all right, even
though it was permanently damaged with more than one-half of the iris missing.)
27. This discovery rule was first applied in West Virginia to underground coal mining
encroachment. Petrelli v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 104 S.E. 103 (W. Va. 1920). It
was later applied to a sponge left in the abdomen by defendant physician in Morgan v.
Grace Hosp., Inc. 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965), and then to attorney malpractice in Fami-
ly Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciecarello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1974). Unless otherwise
provided by statute, the discovery rule applies to all torts in West Virginia. Cart v.
Marcum, 423 S.E.2d 644, 648 (W. Va. 1992). The discovery rule is also part of the equita-
ble doctrine of laches. Bank of Mill Creek v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 57 S.E.2d 736, 746 (W.
Va. 1950).
A recent case casts some uncertainty over the discovery rule in West Virginia. The
West Virginia Supreme Court held that "The 'discovery rule' applies only when there is a
strong showing by the plaintiff that some action of the defendant prevented the plaintiff
from knowing of the wrong at the time of the injury." Cart v. Marcum, 423 S.E.2d 644,
648 (W. Va. 1992).
28. Wilson v. Econom, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1968); see R. MALLEN & J.
SM1TH, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 18.12, at 113-22 (1989); Jeffrey P. Rude, Comment, Limi-
tation of Actions-North Dakota Adopts Continuous Representation Rule for Tolling Statute
of Limitations In Legal Malpractice Actions, 64 N. DAK. L. REV. 719 (1988).
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ty,21 or by conduct of the parties such as agreement, 30 or by actions
constituting estoppel31 or waiver.3 2
In some cases when the statute of limitations has already expired,
a plaintiff may still file a lawsuit if a previous timely filed suit has
been dismissed for a reason not related to the merits ("saving" stat-
utes),33 or file an amended complaint starting a new cause of action
(the relation back doctrine).34 In some classes of cases, the statutory
29. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-4 (1981).
30. Central Bank v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 149 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Ct. App. 1978);
Gorowitz v. Blumenstien, 53 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
31. Humble Oil Co. v. Love, 165 S.E.2d 379, 384 (W. Va. 1969) (prescribing a de-
tailed test for determining whether estoppel exists).
32. See Young v. State Compensation Comm'r., 3 S.E.2d 517 (W. Va. 1939) (holding
that while a party might waive its limitations defense by conduct, a government official
generally cannot so waive it). Some courts have held that the attorney-client relationship
itself will estop the attorney from raising the statute of limitations as a defense. Bornstein
v. Poulos, 793 F.2d 444, 448 (lst Cir. 1986); Allen E. Korpela, Annotation, Fiduciary or
Confidential Relationship as Affecting Estoppel to Plead Statute of Limitations, 45 A.L.R.3d
630 (1972).
33. See W. VA. CODE § 55-2-18 (Supp. 1992). As of 1978, only thirty-one states
have adopted general saving statutes. W.D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAV-
ING STATUTES 2 (1978). In adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, forty-nine states have
enacted a specific savings statute for transactions in goods. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 46-2-
725(3) (1966).
34. The test for allowing a post limitation period amendment to the complaint stating
a new legal theory is whether the new cause of action arises out of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence alleged in the original complaint as the basis for the original
cause of action. If the new theory would not cause unfair surprise or prejudice causing
injustice, and the defendant has an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense, then the new
cause of action would "relate back" to the date of the original filing for purposes of the
statute of limitations. In Bennett v. Owens, 378 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1989), the plaintiff
originally sued the defendant for battery, but after deposing the defendant and apparently
discovering that the defendant was not the person who assaulted the plaintiff (and after the
statute of limitations had run), amended the complaint to allege that the defendant was
negligent in supervising the high school graduation party at the defendant's home and in en-
couraging other guests to behave aggressively. In Jones v. Jones, 400 S.E.2d 305 (W. Va.
1990), the plaintiff filed for divorce in Jan. 1983 on grounds of cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, and amended the complaint in 1985, alleging grounds of living apart for one year. In
May 1983, the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of equitable distribution
(later codified at W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1 (Supp. 1992)) and applied it prospectively to all
cases filed after May 1983. The court held that the plaintiff's amendment stated a new
cause of action, thus entitling the defendant to equitable distribution.
920
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period can begin running anew where the obligor makes a new prom-
ise on, or acknowledgement of, the debt.35 Finally, it must be kept in
mind that the statute of limitations is an affrmative defense and must
be pleaded by the defendant or it is deemed waived. 6
Although any of the above can become major issues when the
question of limitations arises, this Article focuses on the first step,
determining which limitation statute applies to attorney malpractice,
and identifying those purely equitable causes of actions which courts
find are not subject to any statute of limitations, but which are gov-
erned instead by laches.
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ATrORNEY MALPRACTICE
A. Generally
Some states have special statutes of limitations for legal malprac-
tice,37 or a general professional malpractice statute which is held by
When the amended complaint adds a new party defendant, it will not relate back
unless the new defendant (1) received notice of the original action before the running of the
statute, (2) knew or should have known that the original action would have been brought
against her but for a mistake concerning identity of the proper party, and (3) will not be
prejudiced in maintaining her defense on the merits. In Maxwell v. Eastern Assoc. Coal
Corp., 394 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1990), the plaintiff was injured by a fall from a train and
originally sued the wrong railroad companies. After the limitations period had run, the plain-
tiff unsuccessfully attempted to amend the complaint to substitute the involved railroad as
defendant The court, citing West Virginia's reliance on federal cases interpreting similar
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relied heavily on Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21
(1986). Marks Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 408 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991).
35. This most commonly occurs when a debtor makes a partial payment on a debt in
circumstances indicating the debtor is liable on the whole debt. See W. VA. CODE § 55-2-8
(1981).
36. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 8(c); see Walker v. Henry, 14 S.E. 440 (W. Va. 1892); Nellas
v. Loucas, 191 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 1972).
37. See CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE § 340.6 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (1967),
applied in Bradley v. LaPenna, 490 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1973). West Virginia does have
specific statutes of limitations for medical malpractice, W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4 (Supp.
1992), see Thomas J. Humey, Hospital Liability in West Tirginia, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 943
(1993), and for deficiencies in design and construction of improvements to real property, W.
VA. CODE § 55-2-6(a) (Supp. 1992). This latter statute acts as an outside limit on actions,
which are still subject to the general statutes of limitations. Shirkey v. Mackey, 399 S.E.2d
868, 871 (W. Va. 1990).
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courts to cover attorney malpractice.38 West Virginia has neither. This
means that malpractice actions against attorneys are covered by the
general statutes of limitations covering the general causes of actions
available to claimants injured by their attorneys.39
Because the nature of the particular stated cause of action will
usually determine which particular statute of limitations will apply in a
given case, it is necessary to understand the possible different causes
of action a claimant might have against an attorney based upon the
attorney's professional misconduct. There are a number of theoretical
legal bases for such actions. The most common of these is the tort
action for negligent provision of legal services. This view characterizes
attorney malpractice as a tortious breach of the duty to exercise ordi-
nary knowledge and skill in the service of the client, which duty is
created (implied) by, or arises out of, the attorney-client relationship. A
second common theoretical basis of liability is breach of an express
contract promise.40 A third and related theoretical basis of liability is
breach of implied contract promise. A fourth class of attorney malprac-
tice claims arise from breaches of fiduciary obligations such as disclo-
sures of confidential information, conflicts of interest and self-dealing
by a fiduciary.4" A fifth group could be classified as intentional torts,
including actual fraud.42
38. Long v. Bowersox, 8 Ohio N.P. 249 (1909); Muir v. Hadler Real Estate Manage-
ment Co., 446 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio 1982) (applying what is now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.11 (Anderson 1981)).
39. A number of states have a "hybrid" statute of limitations applying to actions "on
contract, obligation, or liability," which are held to apply to both contracts and torts. Such
statutes have been held to cover attorney malpractice. See Higa v. Mirikitani, 517 P.2d 1
(Haw. 1973); Sorenson v. Pavlikowsld, 581 P.2d 851 (Nev. 1978).
40. Technically the failure to perform an express contract promise could be distin-
guished from legal malpractice in that the failure to perform the express promise is not
necessarily related to any deficiency in the quality of legal services rendered, but is merely
the failure to do what one promised to do. Lindner v. Eichel, 232 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct.),
aft'd, 233 N.Y.S.2d 238 (App. Div. 1962). The West Virginia Supreme Court has expressly
stated that "a malpractice action against an attorney ... may be brought on contract."
Harrison v. Casto, 271 S.E.2d 774, syl pt. (1980). In this Article, such contract breaches are
included as simply another form of attorney malpractice.
41. See Bank of Mill Creek v. Elk Horn, 57 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1950) (setting aside
sale of trust certificate collateral where the sale was conducted by the corporation's receiver
and the purchaser was the attorney representing the receiver).
42. Other torts would include malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest or
922 [Vol. 95:913
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In West Virginia, if a court were to find that one of these claims
exist, it would also find that the claim is covered by one of the gener-
al West Virginia statutes of limitations or by laches. An action for a
breach of an oral or unsigned written contract must be brought within
five years, and within ten years if it is for a breach of a signed writ-
ten contract.43 An action based upon a negligent or intentional tort or
other "personal actions" must be brought within two years if it is for
damage to property or person, and within 'one year if it is for any
other matter of a kind which at common law could not have been
brought by or against his personal representative.44 Purely equitable
causes of action, such as rescission of a contract or deed, are not gov-
erned by any statue of limitations in West Virginia. They are covered
by the equitable doctrine of laches. 45 Presumably, when a claimant
imprisonment, interference with contracts, intentional infliction of mental distress, invasion of
privacy, wrongful recording of liens or lis pendens, and defamation.
43. The West Virginia Code states:
Every action to recover money, which is founded upon an award, or on any
contract other than a judgment or recognizance, shall be brought within the follow-
ing number of years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, that
is to say: If the case be upon an indemnifying bond taken under any statute, or
upon a bond of an executor, administrator or guardian, curator, committee, sheriff
or deputy sheriff, clerk or deputy clerk, or any other fiduciary or public officer,
within ten years; if it be upon any other contract in writing under seal, within ten
years; if it be upon an award, or upon a contract in writing, signed by the party
to be charged thereby, or by his agent, but not under seal, within ten years; and
if it be upon any other contract, express or implied, within five years, unless it be
an action by one party against his copartner for a settlement of the partnership
accounts, or upon accounts concerning the trade or merchandise between merchant
and merchant, their factors or servants, where the action of account would lie, in
either of which cases the action may be brought until the expiration of five years
from a cessation of the dealings in which they are interested together, but not
after.
W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6 (1981).
44. The West Virginia Code states:
Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be
brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have
accrued, if it be for damage to property; (b) within two years next after the right
to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries;
and; (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued
if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not
have been brought at common law by or against his personal representative.
W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1981).
45. Laurie v. Thomas, 294 S.E.2d 78 (W. Va. 1982); see also Felsenheld v. Bloch
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seeks an equitable remedy such as an injunction for a claim which is
fundamentally a legal claim based on contract or tort, the appropriate
contract or tort statute of limitations applies, not the common-law doc-
trine of laches.4
It is clear that a single course of conduct by an attorney might
give rise to two or more independently recognized causes of action
against the attorney.47 Each separate cause of action might offer dif-
ferent advantages and disadvantages for the plaintiff, including the fact
that one might invoke a short statute of limitations of only one or two
years (torts) while another might involve a relatively long statute of
limitations of five or ten years (contracts). 48
B. Action Against Attorneys for Breach of Contract
1. The Main Problem: Is the Malpractice Claim Based in
Contract or Tort?
One of the main problems arising in malpractice limitations cases
is determining whether the plaintiff's claim is a contract or a tort
claim, or more importantly, whether the claim (no matter how charac-
terized for other purposes) is covered by the contract or tort statute of
limitations. A contract almost always exists where the malpractice
complainant is a client of the attorney.49 When as part of the contrac-
Bros. Tobacco Co., 192 S.E. 545 (W. Va. 1937).
46. Condry v. Pope, 166 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1969) (statute of limitations applied to a
request for an injunction to prevent trespasser from drilling for and taking oil from land
owned by plaintiff).
47. Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1974); Harri-
son v. Casto, 271 S.E.2d 774 (W. Va. 1980).
48. W. VA. CODE §§ 55-2-12, 55-2-6 (1981). The longer statute of limitations is not
necessarily an advantage to the plaintiff as it might begin running upon the breach of the
contract promise, while the shorter tort statute of limitations will begin running when the
plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the injury. In some cases the longer con-
tracts statute of limitations will have expired before the expiration of the shorter tort statute
of limitations.
49. An attorney-client relationship can exist without traditional forms of consideration.
Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Even where the malpractice claimant was never a client, the claimant may have a third
party beneficiary claim based upon a contract, Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1981),
[Vol. 95:913
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tual agreement with the client, an attorney specifically promises to do
a certain thing or achieve a specific result for the client and fails to
do that specific thing or achieve that specific result, courts have had
little trouble finding that the client has a cause of action for breach of
an express contract.5 This is true even if the attorney used the stan-
dard knowledge and skill common to attorneys in the trade, so that
there is no negligence and therefore no cause of action in tort.
But the problem becomes particularly knotty where the malpractice
does not relate to an express promise by the attorney to do a specific
thing or achieve a specific result. Where there is no breach of a spe-
cific promise, the problem arises when the attorney's conduct is a
breach of obligations implied in and arising out of the contract,5 and
although nonclient claims against attorneys are usually based on tort. See Gerald W. Boston,
Liability of Attorneys to Nonclients in Michigan: A Re-Examination of Friedman v. Dozorc
and a Rule of Limited Liability, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 307 (1991); M. O'Neill, Privity De-
fense in Attorney Malpractice: The Citidel Still Stands, 54 DEF. COUNSEL J. 511 (1987);
Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-Party Liability of
Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 1309 (1991);
Joan Teshima, Annotation, Attorney's Liability, To One Other Than Immediate Client, For
Negligence In Connection With Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R.4th 615 (1988); Jack W. Shaw,
Annotation, Attorney's Liability To One Other Than His Immediate Client For Consequences
of Negligence In Carrying Out Legal Duties, 45 A.L.R.3d 1181 (1972).
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has held that even without privity
of contract, an accountant is liable for the negligent preparation of a financial report to
third parties that she knows will be receiving and relying on the report. First Nat'l Bank of
Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989) (adopting the position of § 552 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977)). But see Weaver v. Union Carbide Corp., 378
S.E.2d 105 (W. Va. 1989), a case decided nine months before Crawford where the West
Virginia Supreme Court held that the lack of privity between a marriage counselor and the
spouse of the counselor's patient foreclosed a claim in malpractice. liL at 109; Rand v.
Miller, 408 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1991) (where employer hired physician to inspect prospec-
tive employee's medical records, there was insufficient professional relationship between the
physician and the prospective employee to support a malpractice action, although defamation
might stand); Sisson v. Seneca Mental Health Council, 404 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1991) (ba-
sis of malpractice action against counselor is trust relationship, and a single counseling
session does not establish such).
50. DiPietro v. Hecker, 251 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Westchester County Ct. 1964); Clen Falls
Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 159 N.Y.S.2d 95 (App. Div. 1957).
51. At the time the attorney makes the arrangement with the client, the attorney rea-
sonably infers, and the client implies, that the client will pay the attorney fees within a
reasonable time after receiving the bills. This expectation and duty arises out of and is
implied by the contractual understanding of the parties. At the same time, the client reason-
13
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at the same time a tortious breach of legal duties implied by law upon
the contractually created attomey-client relationship.5 2 When forced to
identify the nature or gravamen of the claim, for a variety of reasons
both known and unknown,5 3 courts have often preferred to find that
the claim was either one or the other (and not both) and have often
come down on the side of holding it to be a tort.
54
The uncertainty as to the basic character of the claim usually
causes little problem. The claimant generally needs only to allege a
duty arising from the basic surrounding circumstances (either from law
or from promise), a breach of that duty, a reasonable causal relation-
ship between the breach and the unfortunate result, and actual loss
from the unfortunate result.55 But some rules of law, which are occa-
ably infers, and the attorney implies (unless the attorney's fingers are crossed), that the
attorney will exercise the usual knowledge and skill common to similarly situated attorneys.
This expectation arises out of and is implied by their contractual understanding.
52. The traditional elements of a cause of action in tort are:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to con-
form to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unrea-
sonable risks.
2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: a
breach of the duty ....
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury :...
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
W. PAGE KEErON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEEON ON TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
53. It might be that early claims for defective professional services were either in
construction or design contracts where the damages were usually economic losses easily han-
ded by contract principles and medical contracts where the damages were personal injuries,
not readily handled by contract principles. The former were viewed as routine contract prob-
lems and not even described as malpractice problems, just breach of contract problems. The
latter, although arising out of contract, involved the type of physical injuries usually ad-
dressed by tort law. They were therefore treated as tort, but because the special duty of
care arose only out of the special physician-patient relationship, they were treated as a sub-
class of torts called malpractice, logically treated by the tort statutes of limitations. Thus
evolved a practice of treating malpractice as a tort for statutes of limitations purposes.
One school of thought is that malpractice is as mubh a separate area of law as it is
a subclass of tort law. Thus we have "contract" law, "torts" law, and "malpractice" law.
That many states have a separate statute of limitations for malpractice supports this idea.
Where there is none, courts have often turned to the torts limitation statutes.
54. But see Oleyar v. Kerr, 225 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that an action for
attorney negligence, while sounding in tort, is an action for breach of contract and thus
governed by the contract statute of limitations).
55. See Rich v. New York Central & H.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382 (1882). In Rich, the
[Vol. 95:913
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sionally called upon to settle issues ancillary to the basic question of
liability for the conduct, are sometimes not so amorphous and are
labeled rules of "contract" or rules of "tort." When they offer one of
the disputing parties a chance of an absolute defense, as do statutes of
limitation, there is strong incentive to grab the rule and force a deter-
mination of whether it applies to the claim.
Although this issue will be discussed further in this Article, the
general rule in West Virginia can be summed up as follows. Where an
attorney causes loss to a client by failing to exercise the knowledge,
skill, and ability ordinarily exercised by members of the legal profes-
sion, the attorney has committed the tort of legal malpractice, 56 to
which the tort statute of limitations applies. 57 If the attorney makes a
specific, express promise to perform a specific act or achieve a specif-
ic result, and then fails to do so, the resulting claim also can be char-
acterized as a contract claim and the contract statute of limitations will
apply to that claim. Otherwise, the attorney's failure to perform her
undertaking with the requisite knowledge and skill expected of those in
the trade will create only a malpractice cause of action in tort.58 One
of the results of this judicial policy is that the shorter tort statute of
limitations will apply in most instances because attorneys are generally
careful not to make an express promise to take a specific action or to
achieve a specific result.59 Another result of this policy might mean
court stated:
We have been unable to find any accurate and perfect definition of a tort.
Between actions plainly ex contractu and those clearly ex delicto there exists what
has been termed a borderland, where the lines of distinction are shadowy and
obscure, and the tort and the contract so approach each other and become so
nearly coincident as to make their practical distinction somewhat difficult. A tort is
described in general as a wrong independent of a contract. And yet, it is conceded
that a tort may grow out of, or make a part of, or be coincident with, a contract,
and that precisely the same set of facts, between the same parties, may admit of
an action either ex contractu or ex delicto.
Id at 390.
56. Keister v. Talbott, 391 S.E.2d 895 (W. Va. 1990).
57. Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901, 904 (W. Va. 1990).
58. d
59. Those express promises more commonly made by attorneys usually involve the
more easily and clearly performable acts such as "I will file a lawsuit" and "I will deliver
a title search to the bank by Friday." It is also these kinds of promises that support suc-
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that purely economic consequential losses resulting from the attorney's
malpractice might not be recoverable." Finally, this policy means that
the same occurrence can constitute both a contract breach and a tort,
and each cause of action is governed by its respective statute of limi-
tations.6
1
2. Action for Breach of an Express Contract Promise
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has on several
occasions expressly stated that a legal malpractice action can lie in
contract,62 but has apparently only once specifically found such a
cessful malpractice actions based upon express contract promises.
60. One real problem in holding that the attorney's breach of duty to use knowledge
and skill common to the trade creates only a tort cause of action is the traditional rule that
economic loss cannot be recovered in tort. This is not a statute of limitations issue but a
generic negligent tort issue. It peculiarly arises in service contracts where usually no proper-
ty damage or personal injury is at stake, but where the focus of the relationship between
the parties is on business and economic affairs and economic loss is clearly foreseeable,
unavoidable, and often capable of proof with sufficient certainty. These problems are gener-
ally dealt with by breach of contract law. But where negligent performance of implied
contract duties in service contracts have been viewed as negligent malpractice torts, recovery
of such economic losses has been problematic. For example, where a client hires an attor-
ney to draft a contract and both parties know that a negligently drafted contract might
cause the client to lose a business opportunity worth $100,000 in profits, it is only fair to
compensate the client if the $100,000 is lost as a result of the attorney's negligent drafting
of the contract. But in some jurisdictions, such purely economic losses are recoverable only
in contract. Blanche M. Manning, Legal Malpractice: Is It Tort or Contract?, 21 LoY. U.
CM. L.J. 741 (1990) (discussing the problem in Illinois, a problem which may have been
since settled by Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1105 (lL. 1993)). If the client's malpractice
action sounds only in tort, this can mean that the only possible loss is not recoverable.
West Virginia has traditionally held that where there has been no injury to person
or property, economic loss is recoverable only in contract and not in tort. But the Supreme
Court has apparently created an exception to this rule for malpractice, allowing liability in
tort for purely economic loss in a string of cases beginning in the mid-1980s. See Brammer
v. Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207, 213 (W. Va. 1985); Wells v. Tennant, 375 S.E.2d 798, 802 (W.
Va. 1988); First Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 312 (W. Va. 1989)
(adopting the Restatement position that a professional (here an accountant) is liable for
pecuniary loss if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence).
61. Harrison v. Casto, 271 S.E.2d 774 (W. Va. 1980); Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d
901 (W. Va. 1990).
62. Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1990); Harrison v. Casto, 271 S.E.2d
774 (W. Va. 1980); Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va.
1974).
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contract action to exist. 63 Unfortunately, in holding that the client had
a contract cause of action against his attorney in Harrison v. Casto,6
the court failed to reveal the underlying facts upon which it based the
finding of the contract promise and resulting liability. In Harrison, the
client hired the defendant second attorney specifically to sue the first
attorney for failing to bring suit against an airline for injuries. The
second attorney failed to sue the first attorney before the tort statute of
limitations had expired on the right to sue the first attorney, so the
client sued the second attorney for malpractice in failing to timely
bring the suit against the first attorney. In dismissing the case, the
court held that "such malpractice action can be brought either on con-
tract or in tort"65 and since the client's "action on a breach of con-
tract then survived against [the attorney]" the client had suffered no
injury. In deciding that the client had a breach of contract malpractice
claim against the first attorney (which therefore still survived) the
court cited only facts underlying the client's cause of action against
the second attorney, not any facts related to the client's cause of ac-
tion against the first attorney. The failure or confusion may not be so
meaningful in that both suits were based upon a similar basic occur-
rence, the hiring of an attorney to bring suit and the failure of the
attorney to bring the suit. But as the following discussion shows, the
specific language used by the attorney in the engagement agreement is
now used by the court to determine whether the attorney made an
express contract promise.
63. In at least two other West Virginia cases, both in federal court, the court might
well have found an express contract promise was made and breached by the attorney. In
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, Smith, Spilman & CLay, 224 F. 271 (S.D. W. Va. 1915),
the attorney was directed to make an appearance and defend the client and failed to so
appear. In stating that the total failure to defend the client might entitle the client to nomi-
nal damages, the court implied that there was a breach of contract. Ii at 273. Otherwise
there was no discussion of contract and the court used negligence language in its opinion.
The case was dismissed because even nominal damages would not have satisfied the federal
diversity jurisdictional requirements. In Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93
(N.D. W. Va. 1961), the attorney's failure to timely file an appeal might possibly have
been a breach of an express promise to the client's agent to do so. This issue was not
discussed and the case was dismissed on other grounds.
64. 271 S.E.2d 774 (W. Va. 1980).
65. IAL at 776.
66. IAL
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Nevertheless, Harrison could be read to stand for the following
two propositions: (1) where an attorney is engaged to bring suit
against another, failure to bring suit constitutes a malpractice breach of
contract, and, (2) where the complaint alleges that inaction of an attor-
ney constitutes a breach of the contract of employment, a cause of
action in contract is stated.67
But where there is no additional specific promise to perform a
particular act or achieve a specific result, then many courts seem to
view the breach not so much as a breach of contract promise, but a
breach of a duty implied by law and imposed upon the attorney by the
attorney-client relationship, not by the contract itself. These courts find
this legal duty is best handled, at least as a malpractice issue, by tort
law and therefore apply the tort statute of limitations where there is
not also an independent contract cause of action based upon a specific
contract promise.
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia directly
addressed this question in Hall v. Nichols.68 The plaintiff in Hall
owned certain real property and gave a bank a lien on the property to
finance a new building being built on the property. The plaintiff hired
an attorney to prepare a certificate of title covering the property and
deliver the certificate to the bank, and the attorney did so.69 It was
later discovered that the title certificate failed to reveal an existing
prior lien on the property. The existence of the prior lien created a
dispute between plaintiff and the bank regarding the proceeds from the
sale of the condominium units, causing a delay in the sale of those
units. The bank then sued to enjoin the plaintiff from renting any of
the condominium units, using the same attorney (who had prepared the
title certificate for the plaintiff) to prepare and file the complaint. At
this point, the plaintiff dismissed the attorney as its counsel and the
attorney continued to represent the bank.70 Twenty-six months later,
67. But, as the court subsequently indicated in Hall v. Nichols, the complaint must
probably also allege that the attorney specifically promised to take the action which the
attorney failed to take. Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901, 904 (W. Va. 1990).
68. 400 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1990).
69. The attorney was also retained to provide legal counsel concerning the develop-
ment, to help with several other loan transactions, and to represent client at the loan clos-
ing. Id at 903.
70. The lawsuit forced the plaintiff into bankruptcy and the bank eventually foreclosed
[Vol. 95:913930
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the plaintiff sued the attorney for malpractice based upon the failure to
discover the prior lien during preparation of the certificate of title, for
negligently failing to have a survey performed in connection with the
title search (which evidently would have somehow revealed the prob-
lem),7 1 and for improperly representing the bank against the plaintiff
in the same matter.72 The attorney successfully raised the tort statute
of limitations as a defense and was granted a summary judgment. On
appeal the client argued that his complaint had stated a contract claim
in addition to tort.
While acknowledging that a legal malpractice action may sound in
tort and in contract,7 3 the court focused on the basic agreement of the
parties, the nature of the attorney's failure, and the language in the
complaint. Apparently having little beyond the facts alleged in the
complaint upon which to base its decision, the court focused on the
essential complaint language:
The foregoing conduct of the defendant ... was willful, wanton, and
gross negligence, in reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiffs and in
violation of his contractual, fiduciary and ethical obligations to the plain-
tiffs as his clients.74
The court found that "[n]otwithstanding the inclusion of the term 'con-
tractual' in the amended complaint, the essence of the appellant's
cause of action is various breaches of duties imposed by law and not
by contract."7 5 The court emphasized that there was no evidence that
the attorney made any specific promise to the plaintiff that he would
conduct the title search in any particular manner, or that he would hire
a surveyor to survey the property, or that he would refrain from repre-
on the condominium property.
71. The opinion does not reveal how a survey during the title search would have
caused discovery of the problem. See Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901, 903 (W. Va. 1990).
72. Importantly, the court did not mention laches, or the possible inapplicability of
any statute of limitations to the equitable ramifications of the alleged breach of fiduciary
duty. See infra notes 106-07 (discussing laches and Rodgers v. Rodgers).
73. Hall, 400 S.E.2d at 903.
74. Id at 903.
75. Id at 904 (emphasis supplied by the court).
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senting the bank in any related lawsuits. The court then stated its hold-
ing:
Only when the breach pertains specifically to the "terms of the contract
without any reference to the duties imposed by law upon the [attorney/
client] relationship .. ." is the cause of action contractual in nature.7
The court's statement in syllabus point 2 of the case uses slightly
different wording:
Where the act complained of in a legal malpractice action is a breach of
specific terms of the contract without reference to the legal duties imposed
by law on the attorney/client relationship, the action is contractual in na-
ture. Where the essential claim of the action is a breach of duty imposed
by law on the attorney/client relationship and not of the contract itself, the
action lies in tort.'
Concluding its discussion, the court held that because the com-
plaint contained no allegations regarding a breach of the "obligations
of [the attorney's] employment as counsel" and because "the claims at
issue are grounded in tort since they arise as breaches of [the
attorney's] duty to perform legal services in a non-negligent fashion-
duties which are implied by law-we conclude... that the tort statute
of limitations controls."
78
But although the court states that the complaint contained no
allegations of breach of the obligations of the attorney's employment
as counsel, in fact the complaint did, at least in general terms. The
plaintiff alleged that the attorney's actions were "in violation of his
[the attorney's] contractual... obligations." 79 Therefore, the court
must have meant that there were no allegations regarding a breach of
specific promises made by the attorney to the client as part of their
employment contract.80 It is this lack of a contract promise to do a
76. Id. at 904 (quoting Pancake House, Inc. v. Redman, 716 P.2d 575, 578 (Kan.
1986)) (alteration in original).
77. Id. at 902.
78. Id at 904.
79. Id at 903.
80. The court also uses puzzling language in its dismissal of the client's second cause
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specific thing (that which was not done) that apparently leads the court
to find the duty arises by law and not out of the contract, and is
therefore an action in tort, not contract.
3. Determining Whether a Specific Contract Promise
Has Been Made (And Breached)
This of course focuses on a main question addressed in this Arti-
cle: which kind of promise will be specific enough to raise a contract
cause of action invoking the contract statute of limitations of five or
ten years? The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia apparently
found that such a promise was made in Harrison v. Casto when the
attorney agreed to bring suit for the client and then failed to do so.81
But in Harrison we are left to guess whether the attorney specifically
promised to bring the lawsuit because we do not have knowledge of
the underlying facts (nor did the court by all indications).
It is likely that if the court follows its rule in Hall, it will require
evidence that the attorney specifically promised to perform the specific
act82 and that the attorney either took no steps to perform the act or
failed to complete the technical steps of the act. If the promised act
was technically completed, even if completed in a grossly negligent
manner, there would be no breach of contract, merely a negligent
performance of the contract giving rise to a negligence malpractice
action in tort.
of action. The attorney allegedly improperly represented the bank in a suit against the client
in the same matter in which the attorney was representing the client. The court stated this
cause of action "concerns [the attorney's] negligence" in representing the bank in its suit
against the client. Id at 905. In fact, the client's claim stated that the attorney "improperly
represented the National Bank" and later "in violation of his . . . fiduciary and ethical obli-
gations" seem to be clear allegations of the attorney's breach of fiduciary obligations, ac-
tions which are quite different from professional negligence. It is also puzzling why the
court did not discuss why the alleged breach of fiduciary duties in this case did not invoke
laches instead of statutes of limitation, especially coming only one month after it so held in
Rodgers v. Rodgers. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. Although in Harrison,
the attorney's clear breach of fiduciary duty most likely did not cause the loss complained
of, it might have supported a finding of punitive damages.
81. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
82. And the court might also require that the specific promise was made as part of
the employment contract, so that it could be viewed as a contract promise.
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In other states, courts have found a variety of contract promises to
have created contract causes of action, therefore calling for the appli-
cation of the contract statute of limitations. But a good many courts
have held in similar situations that no malpractice contract cause of
action arose, and therefore some other statute of limitations, usually
tort, applied to the malpractice lawsuit.
8 3
4. Other Factors Considered by Courts in Determining Whether
the Contract or Tort Statute of Limitations Applies
The nature of the injury has also been important in determining
whether a contract cause of action arose. Courts have held that person-
al injury or property damage is best covered by tort law as the rules
of contract law are not well suited to govern the rights and responsi-
bilities of. the parties, and actions for such injuries are covered by tort
and not contract statutes of limitations." The West Virginia Supreme
Court has so held in a recent case not involving professional malprac-
tice, stating:
Where a person suffers personal injury as a result of a defective product
and seeks to recover damages for these personal injuries based on a breach
of an express or implied warranty, the applicable statute of limitations is
the two year provisions [in tort] contained in W. Va. Code, 55-2-12
(1959), rather than the four year [contract] provision contained in our
Uniform Commercial Code,... 46-2-725.0
The court applied the two-year tort statute despite the fact that the
underlying transaction was clearly a transaction covered by the Uni-
form Commercial Code86 in that there was a breach of warranty in a
83. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Governs Damage
Action Against Attorney for Malpractice, 2 A.L.R.4th 284 (1980).
84. Bland v. Smith, 277 S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. 1954).
85. Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 408 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1991); see also Maynard v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973).
86. The claim was based upon a defective purchased automobile, and was therefore a
transaction in goods covered by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. W. VA. CODE
§§ 46-2-102, 46-2-105 (1966).
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contract for the sale of goods therefore encompassing a cause of action
under the Uniform Commercial Code. 7
In determining whether the complaint sounds in tort or contract,
the court will also be influenced by the type of damages requested.
Where the complaint asks for punitive damages, the court is more
likely to view the action as tort, as punitives are rarely recoverable in
contract.8"
The court will also look at the specific allegations contained in the
complaint to determine whether a cause of action lies in contract or in
tort. In Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello,"9 the complaint
charged that the attorney "negligently, carelessly, and unskillfully con-
ducted his title examination ... and did not use proper diligence." 90
Although the court found the complaint implied that a contract was
made, "there was no express charge of breach of contract or any fur-
ther references to the contract in the complaint."91 The court held that
the very basis for the action was the charge of negligence against the
attorney and sounded exclusively in tort. The court pointed out that the
plaintiff could have chosen an action in tort or contract, but chose to
allege tort. Therefore, the tort statute of limitations applied under sec-
tion 55-2-12(c) of the West Virginia Code, and the malpractice suit
was time-barred.92
87. See W. VA. CODE §§ 46-2-314 & 46-2-315 (1966) (creating implied warranties),
§ 46A-2-107 (making these warranties non-disclaimable in consumer transactions), §§ 46-2-
711 & 46-2-715 (making the seller liable for personal injuries arising out of breach of the
contract), and § 46-2-725 (providing that the statute of limitations for a breach of warranty
under the U.C.C. is four years).
88. See Hillhouse v. McDowell, 410 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1966); Bland v. Smith, 277
S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. 1954).
89. 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1974).
90. Il at 160.
91. AL
92. For a discussion of the liberal rule allowing amendment of pleadings to assert the
statute of limitations during or even after the trial is over, see Nellas v. Loucas, 191 S.E.2d
160 (W. Va. 1972). The court did not address amending the complaint to assert a new
cause of action, but amending an answer to assert the affirmative defense of the statute of
limitations.
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5. Where the Action Lies in Contract, Determining the
Proper Period
Where a cause of action in contract is found, the court will apply
the five-year period of section 55-2-6 if the contract was oral, or writ-
ten and not signed, and the ten-year period if it is written and signed
or made under seal. 3 If the contract is written and signed but the
specific promise that is breached is an oral promise, it is not clear
whether the five-year or ten-year statutory period applies.94
C. Torts
The West Virginia Supreme Court recently held that "[ain attorney
who undertakes to perform professional services for a client is required
to exercise the knowledge, skill, and ability ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of the legal profession in similar circumstanc-
es.",95 It went on to quote with favor an earlier test for actionable
legal malpractice: "In a suit against an attorney for negligence, the
plaintiff must prove three things in order to recover: (1) The attorney's
employment; (2) his neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) that such
negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the
client. '9
When the malpractice is grounded in tort, the tort limitation period
applies.97 The couit then has to determine whether the two-year or
one-year limitation period of section 55-2-12 applies. In Hall, the court
referred favorably to the Harrison court's "determination that the na-
ture of the underlying tort-personal damages or property damages-
should be the controlling factor when resolving this issue .... "9
93. See w. VA. CODE § 55-2-6 (1981).
94. See Schmulbach v. Williams, 120 S.E. 600 (W. Va.'1900).
95. Keister v. Talbott, 391 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1990) (attorney's title search failed to
discover an outconveyance of mineral rights, allegedly due to improper indexing of the land
books by the county clerk).
96. IAL (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1916)).
97. Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1990).
98. Id. at 905.
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Then, in an interesting use of the term "property damages," the court
held that the underlying tort action in Hall involved property damage
"given the obvious diminution of the value of the condominium com-
plex which resulted from appellant's inability to sell certain units once
the lien dispute arose." 99 Accordingly, the court found the action con-
trolled by the two-year period set forth for personal injury or property
damage.1
°°
This expressly overruled the court's previous decision in Family
Savings, where the attorney's title certificate did not reveal the subject
property was subject to a prior deed stipulation requiring the removal
of all structures on the property, thus making the property less valu-
able as security for the plaintiff bank's loan. In Family Savings, the
court held, "Insomuch as the damages alleged to have been suffered in
this case cannot be characterized as personal injuries or property dam-
ages, it follows that the action falls into the second category [not
bringable after death by the injured party's representative at common
law]." ' '° The Family Savings court did not examine the question of
whether the action was one which could not have been brought after
the death of an injured party.
D. Laches
Courts traditionally held that the statute of limitations did not
apply to actions in courts of equity, but that time considerations were
governed by the equitable doctrine of laches.'02 Over time, as courts
99. I&
100. L The court specifically noted that its decision was overruling its decision in
Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1974), which held that
a negligently prepared title certificate which drastically reduced the value of the realty was
governed by the one-year period set forth in the same statute.
101. Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1974).
102. Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvan-
tage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived
her right. The basis for laches presupposes the want of diligence and activity by a party
litigant, which has wrought a change of position by, or disadvantage to, his adversary. But
this lack of activity and diligence does not affect the rights of a party, when such party
had no reason to be aware of facts establishing his rights. Bank of Mill Creek v. Elkhorn
Coal Corp., 57 S.E.2d 736, 746 (W. Va. 1950); Baker v. Shofield, 243 U.S. 114, 121
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of law and legislatures created more and more legal causes of actions,
litigants began to pursue equitable remedies for claims which were
basically legal and not equitable actions. The result was overlapping
jurisdiction of courts of law and courts of equity. As courts of equity
began to hear more claims based upon legal causes of action, they
began to apply the usual statutes of limitations to these equity cases,
first by analogy, and then directly. West Virginia courts have consis-
tently applied statutes of limitations to equitable actions which are
based upon legal claims."°3
Yet the courts continually held onto the rule that statutes of limi-
tations did not apply to purely equitable causes of actions. Although
the distinction between courts of law and courts of equity has been
abolished in West Virginia,104 the distinction remains, at least as to
the application of statutes of limitations and laches. °5 In Rodgers v.
Rodgers,10 6 an attorney represented his parents in their legal affairs
during their lifetime, and upon their deaths acted as attorney for their
estates. In this role, the attorney approved an appraisal of the estate
which did not list shares of stock which had been treated by his de-
ceased parents as their own property for many years, but which turned
out had been originally purchased by the parents in the names of the
attorney and the attorney's sister. The administrator of the estate sued
the attorney, alleging conversion of stock and asking the court to order
the stock returned to the estate. When the attorney asserted the statute
of limitations as a defense, the court found that the timeliness of the
(1917); see Harrison v. Miller, 21 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1942).
What constitutes laches depends on the particular facts of each case. Hartley v.
Ungvari, 318 S.E.2d 634, 638 (W. Va. 1984); White v. Manchin, 318 S.E.2d 470, 473 (W.
Va. 1984); Herzog v. Fox, 93 S.E.2d 239, 247 (W. Va. 1956). Where a fiduciary relation-
ship exists, the defense of laches is not favored by the courts. Work v. Rogerson, 160
S.E.2d 159, 168 (W. Va. 1968).
103. Bank of Mill Creek, 57 S.E.2d at 748-49.
104. W. VA. R. CIV. P. 2.
105. "The fact that Rule 2 of our Rules of Civil Procedure states that 'all procedural
distinctions between actions, suits and other judicial proceedings at law or in equity and in
the forms of action are abolished' does not mean the distinction between our various stat-
utes of limitations and the equitable doctrine of laches are also abolished." Laurie v. Thom-
as, 294 S.E.2d 78, syl. pt. 2 (W. Va. 1982)
106. 399 S.E.2d 664 (W. Va. 1990).
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action was not governed by any statute of limitations, but was instead
governed by the equitable doctrine of laches. In so holding, the court
emphasized that as attorney for his parents and for his parents estate,
the attorney was in the highest fiduciary position, and therefore the
challenged actions bore substantial equitable overtones. The claim was
therefore a purely equitable action controlled by laches and not by the
statute of limitations. The court stated its rule as:
Statute of limitations are not applicable in equity to subjects of exclusively
equitable cognizance. Matters pertaining to fiduciary relationships come
within this rule."°
It must be pointed out that the court in Rodgers did not use the
word "malpractice," nor did it speak in terms of attorney misconduct.
Instead it spoke in terms of fiduciary relationships and fiduciary obli-
gations. Although the court would have clearly reached the same result
had the defendant been a nonattorney fiduciary of this estate, the court
stressed that it was the defendant's role as attorney for the decedents
and attorney for the decedents' estates that created the fiduciary rela-
tionship, the breach of which gave rise to a purely equitable claim and
not a legal claim subject to the statute of limitations. This decision is
precedent for holding that breaches of fiduciary duties will invoke
laches in West Virginia. It must be kept in mind however that the
plaintiff in Rodgers was also requesting an equitable remedy in the
form of reconveyance of stocks to the estate. If the lawsuit was based
upon some other breach of fiduciary duty and was requesting an award
of monetary damages, it might not be so easily predicted that the court
would reject possible statutes of limitations and apply laches instead.
In Bank of Mill Creek v. Elkhorn Coal Corp.," 8 shareholders of
a corporation in receivership brought a shareholder derivative suit
against attorneys of the receiver for reconveyance of collateral held by
the corporation but sold to the attorneys at a receivers sale. The court,
107. Id at 670 (quoting Felsenheld v. Block Bros. Tobacco Co., 192 S.E. 545 (W. Va.
1937)); see also Annotation, Statute of Limitations in Stockholder's Derivative Suit Against
Director or Officer, 123 A.L.R. 346 (1937).
108. 57 S.E.2d 736 (V. Va. 1950). In Mill Creek, the court did not discuss the possi-
bility of applying a statute of limitations.
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emphasizing that the attorney-client relationship is of the highest fidu-
ciary nature, held that laches was not available as a defense to a
breach of the attorney-client confidence unless it was plainly apparent
therefrom, and that laches was not regarded with favor in a suit be-
tween parties in a confidential relationship. 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has adopted a
clear rule providing that an attorney's failure to use the knowledge and
skill common to the trade in performing his undertakings for the client
will be covered by the tort statute of limitations, and the two-year
period contained in that statute will apply at least to negligence relat-
ing to real property title certificates. The longer contracts statute of
limitations will apply only where the client can show that the attorney
specifically promised to perform a particular act which was not per-
formed or to achieve a specific result which was not achieved, and
even then maybe only if the specific promise was part of the
attorney's contractual undertaking. Because attorneys are very unlikely
to promise specific results, the application of the contract statute of
limitations will likely be limited to attorney promises to produce and
deliver certain documents by a stated date, such as promises to file a
lawsuit, file an appeal, prepare and deliver a contract or articles of
incorporation, and like matters. The more commonly occurring mal-
practice, that which occurs when an attorney technically carries out the
specifically requested task, but just carries it out in a negligent or
ineffective way, will likely be left to the shorter tort statute of limita-
tions.
This is not particularly undesirable. What is important in the appli-
cation of a statute of limitations to attorney malpractice, no matter
which statute is applied, is to (1) prevent the statute from expiring
before the client knows, or has reason to know, of the injury,
(2) prevent the statute from running while the client is still under the
influence of the attorney or is waiting for the attorney to solve the
problem that has been created by the attorney's malpractice, and
109. Id at 747.
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(3) provide a cause of action which allows recovery for the kinds of
losses (generally economic) which would naturally arise out of the
attorney-client relationship." 0
West Virginia seems to have solved the first problem by adopting
the discovery rule." The string of cases on point include tolling the
statute on conversion of underground coal from a mine located on
adjacent property until the coal owner had occasion to discover the
coal was missing,1. tolling the statute on leaving a sponge in a
patient's abdomen until the patient had reason to discover its pres-
ence,113 and tolling the statute for negligently failing to refer to a
severely limiting deed restriction in a title certificate until the client
had reason to learn of the deed restriction.11 4 In these cases, the
West Virginia Supreme Court has ensured that the statute of limita-
tions will not run before the claimant has reason to know of the in-
jury.
The second problem should be solved by adopting the continuous
representation rule. This rule delays the running of the statute as long
110. In a thoughtful article on statutes of limitations and attorney malpractice, Koffler
identifies the aspects of the application of statutes of limitations to attorney malpractice that
are particularly unfair and unjust, and proposes the adoption of the following rules (summa-
rized):
(1) The defendant attorney has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence, that the plaintiff former client knew or had reason to know, taking into
account plaintiff former client's intelligence, education, and experience:
(a) The existence of facts supporting each and every element of the cause of
action including damage, and
(b) that the attorney's representation in the particular matter was terminated.
(2) Where the plaintiff former client was also negligent, comparative negligence
should apply.
(3) Both tort and contract causes of actions should lie where appropriate, each
with its respective statute of limitations.
(4) The tort statute of limitation should be three years but not less than two years.
(5) In no event shall the statute of limitations expire until one year after all of
the above facts come into being.
Joseph H. Koffier, Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A Critical Analysis of a Bur-
geoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L. REV. 209, 257-59 (1986).
111. But see the question raised in Cart v. Marcum, supra note 27.
112. Petrelli v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 104 S.E. 103 (W. Va. 1920).
113. Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965).
114. Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1974).
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as the malpracticing attorney is representing the claimant, and thereby
both leading the client to believe that there is no problem or that the
attorney is taking care of the problem, or influencing the client
through embarrassment, intimidation, or even fear to not seek redress
for the injury. There are indications that the West Virginia Supreme
Court will apply this rule to legal malpractice at the appropriate oppor-
tumity.
The West Virginia Supreme Court seems to be well on its way to
solving the third problem by allowing the recovery of economic losses
under a tort cause of action in service contracts." 5
The court does need to clarify its position on whether breaches of
fiduciary duties, including conflicts of interests, revealing confidential
information, and other actions which are particularly susceptible to
attorney misconduct, are governed by statutes of limitations or by la-
ches. The court indicated that they are covered by laches in the
Rodgers case, but obfuscated the matter by not characterizing the con-
duct as legal malpractice, but simply wrongful conduct by a fiduciary.
They had a chance to clarify the position in the Hall case where the
attorney represented both the plaintiff and the adverse party in the
same matter, but did not raise the issue, and dismissed the allegations
of conflict of interest in Hall as simply attorney negligence.
115. See discussion supra note 60.
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